Louisiana\u27s Stop and Frisk Law - A Constitutional Question by Niles, Stewart E., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 3
April 1969
Louisiana's Stop and Frisk Law - A Constitutional
Question
Stewart E. Niles Jr.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Stewart E. Niles Jr., Louisiana's Stop and Frisk Law - A Constitutional Question, 29 La. L. Rev. (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol29/iss3/5
COMMENTS
LOUISIANA'S STOP AND FRISK LAW-
A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The Louisiana legislature has recently enacted a statute per-
mitting law enforcement officers to "stop and frisk" suspicious
persons.1 Undoubtedly this unprecedented investigatory autho-
rity will enhance the ability of local law enforcement officials
to prevent crime and detect violators of the law. However, our
statute has not yet been interpreted nor its exact scope deter-
mined by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the constitutional
validity of a stop for questioning and subsequent frisk is still
uncertain. 2 This Comment analyzes the elements and constitu-
tionality of the new statute.
Statutory grants of authority to "stop and frisk" are strik-
ingly similar. The most widely followed are the Uniform Arrest
Act' and the New York Stop and Frisk Law. 4 Both permit offi-
cers to stop for questioning persons whose behavior gives rise
to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity5 and to "frisk" those
individuals they reasonably believe dangerous.6 The major dif-
ference is that the Uniform Act provides for a two-hour deten-
tion7 while the New York law is silent as to length of detention.8
1. LA. CODE CRIA. P. art. 215.1 (Supp. 1968). Exactly what constitutes a
"stop" or "frisk" is not certain. A "stop" is generally considered a detention,
usually quite brief, for the purpose of investigation. The "frisk" is viewed as a
cursory pat down of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons. See Terry v.
Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) ; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
2. Sibron v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1889, n.20 (1968) ; Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct.
1868, n.16 (1968).
3. The text of the Uniform Arrest Act appears in Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343-47 (1942). These provisions were adopted
with slight modification: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902, 1903 (1953) ; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:1-23 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 12-7-1 (1953);
MODEL CODE Or PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
Provisions are related on stopping and questioning: MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 41,
§98 (1961).
4. N.Y. CODE CRiu. PROC. LAW § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1968). Almost
idential provisions: LA. CODE CamI. P. 215.1 (Supp. 1968) ; NEB. LAWS ch. 132,
at 471 (1965).
5. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320-21 (1942)
N.Y. CODE CRIA1. PRoc. LAW § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1968).
6. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 325 (1.942) ; N.Y.
CODE Caim. Paoc. LAW § 180-a (MeKinney Supp. 1968).
7. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VTA. L. REV. 315, 320, 344 1942).
See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURES §§ 2.01, 2.02 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966).
8. New York courts, in the absence of a fixed period, have interpreted the
statute to permit a reasonable period of detention. See United States v. Thomas,
250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Similarly, the Louisiana statute, patterned after the New York
law, sanctions an investigatory "stop" and questioning upon
reasonable suspicion, authorizes a self-protective "frisk," and
provides for the admissibility of seized weapons or other objects
the possession of which may constitute a crime.9
The Stop
The fourth amendment is the principal obstacle which stop
and frisk legislation must overcome. The initial problem in deter-
mining the constitutionality of detention for questioning is the
relationship between the statutory standard of reasonable sus-
picion and the constitutional standard of probable cause.
Stop v. Arrest
The fourth amendment requires that probable cause exist
before arrest.1" If the "stop" is considered an arrest within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, any stop without "probable
cause" will be unreasonable. 1 However, two arguments suggest
that probable cause is inapplicable to investigatory stops.2 First,
it is possible to argue that because the automatic consequences
of an arrest are not present when a person is merely stopped, a
temporary detention is not a "seizure" in the constitutional
sense. 13 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
9. Compare the provisions of LA. CODE CRIM. P. 215.1 (Supp. 1968) : "Tem-
porary questioning of persons in public places; searches for weapons.
"A. A law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom
he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony
or misdemeanor and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.
"B. When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pur-
suant to this Article, and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb,
he may search the outer clothing of such a person for a dangerous weapon or for
any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime.
"C. If -the law enforcement officer finds a dangerous weapon or any other
thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it
until the completion of the questioning at which time he shall either return, it,
if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person."
10. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Henry v. United
States 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; cf. Carroll v. United States, 237 U.S. 132 (1925).
11. "Arrest" has most commonly been used in a technical sense to mean a
seizure of a person to answer for a crime. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347
Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964): See Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the
Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 393 (1963) ; Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1093 (1964). The United States Supreme Court seems to follow this meaning.
See note 28 infra. But see United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass.
1960) ; State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327 (1963) ; State v. Sullivan,
65 Wash. 2d 47, 395 P.2d 745 (1964), where it was held that an arrest was
completed when the officer merely stopped the suspect.
12. Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 848, 858 (1965). See also Comment, 41
S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1968).
13. See United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States
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dealt with the propriety of a "stop," it appears that it has re-
jected such an argument. The Court reasoned that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away"'1 the fourth amendment's standard of reasonable-
ness applies whether or not the person so seized is formally
arrested. 5
Second, it could be argued that a temporary detention is a
lesser "seizure" than, and distinguishable from, an arrest; there-
fore, a less stringent standard than probable cause should be
required.', This contention seems more persuasive. Traditionally,
an arrest has been defined as the "taking of a person into cus-
tody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the com-
mission of a crime.' ' 17 The person is booked, fingerprinted, in-
dicted, and often incarcerated. The arrest also gives rise to an
extensive search of the individual arrested. For such a serious
intrusion of individual liberty, it is undeniably sound to require
antecedent "probable cause.' 8 Strictly applying these standards,
opponents of the investigatory "stop" urge that any seizure of
a person by a police officer is an arrest and therefore unlawful
unless based upon probable cause.1 9 On the other hand, advocates
urge that a brief detention is not as serious a restriction as an
arrest, because the individual is neither subjected to the pro-
cedural machinery of a formal arrest nor to public record of
suspicion. Thus, within the context of the fourth amendment a
qualitative distinction between an arrest and an investigatory
detention permitted on grounds less stringent than probable
cause is reasonable.20
Most lower federal and state courts, 21 faced with determining
v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Bonanno, 180 '.
Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
14. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968).
15. Id. at 1879.
16. See note 21 infra.
17. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18 (1931). See note 11 supra.
18. United States v. Rundle, 274 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
19. See Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402 (1960) ; Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest
and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 251
(1966). See DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960), wherein
the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted its statute to require probable cause
for a detention.
20. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRim. L.C.
& P.S. 393 (1963) ; Ronayne, The Right To Investigate and New York's "Stop
and Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964) ; Seigel, The New York "Frisk"
and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV.
274 (1964). See also Comment, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1965) ; Note, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 311 (1938).
21. See, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Dupree
v. United States, 380 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rundle, 274
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the constitutionality of a "stop," agree that the above distinc-
tion can be validly drawn and have refused to hold an on-the-
street detention without probable cause ipso facto unreasonable.
Agreeing that a detention is a lesser invasion of personal liberty
than an arrest and that the consequences of a detention are less
serious than those of an arrest, these courts have found a deten-
tion not to be an arrest thus requiring a less stringent standard
of reasonableness. Other courts have reached the same result by
holding that an arrest does not occur until the officer intends
to charge the suspect with a specific crime. Since this intent is
not present in an investigatory stop, no arrest occurs; thus the
absence of probable cause does not deprive the detention of con-
stitutionality.
22
Reasonableness of the Stop
Formal legal reasoning will not in itself be sufficient to
determine whether detention for questioning should be allowed.
The constitutional balance which best reflects the demands of a
democratic society must be struck by considering the reasonable-
ness of the statutory authority. 2 3 A primary factor in determin-
ing the reasonableness of the "stop" is the extent to which in-
dividual freedom is invaded. The "stop" may be a lesser invasion
of privacy than an arrest, but it still constitutes a severe, though
brief, intrusion upon personal security.24 Although the person
detained is not subjected to the processes of an arrest, he may
feel compelled, by reason of ignorance, fear, or respect, to submit
to the officer's authority. Thus, although there may be a deten-
tion without the exercise of physical force, the detention is rarely
voluntary and some degree of compulsion is to be expected. 2
On the other hand, such invasion of individual privacy may
F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 411, 201 N.E. 2d 32, 252 N.Y.S. 2d
458 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 978 (1965). The Louisiana provision sanc-
tioning a temporary detention for questioning apparently follows the distinction
relied upon in the above instances. See note 9 supra.
22. See, e.g., United States v. McKendrick, 266 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) ; Michaels v. State, 2 Md. App. 424, 234 A.2d 772 (1967).
23. Sibron v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1902 (1968). See Terry v. Ohio, 88
S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).
25. Comment, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1968). In addition the persons who
will 'bear the brunt of the power to stop and question will be the members of the
minority groups in the cities. Indiscriminate use of the detention for questioning
will excite the already tense relations between these groups and police officers
and will act as a catalyst for social unrest. PRESIDENT'S COxiM'N ON LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE TAsi FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967).
See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 N.W. U.L. REV. 16 (1957)
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966).
[Vol. XXIX
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be justified by the advantages accruing to society.26 Pre-arrest
detention is deemed essential, because without it there is a gap
in the public protection by the police. It is reasoned that these
advantages to society would far outweigh any inconvenience to
the person detained, especially since the innocent person could
explain his actions, clear himself and be on his way in minutes.2 7
Consequently, to protect these interests the grounds for allowing
an investigatory stop need not be as incriminating as those upon
which an arrest may be based.
With these considerations in mind, the United States Su-
preme Court may have lain the groundwork for upholding an
investigatory detention. 2 8 First, the Court in Terry v. Ohio,29
although stating that it did not decide the constitutional validity
"of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for
purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation, ' '20 implicitly rec-
ognized the authority of police, in the proper circumstances, "to
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly crimi-
nal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest."' 1 Secondly, while side-stepping the problems of the
"stop," the Court in Terry held that there are circumstances
which permit a "frisk. 21 2 Justice Harlan,33 in his concurring
opinion, recognized the weakness of such a conclusion without
26. Without this police tool the governmental interests in providing effective
prevention and detecting of crime would be severely hampered. Terry v. Ohio, 88
S. Ct. 1868 (1968). See also Ronayne, The Right To Investigate and New York's
"Stop and Frisk" Laze, 33 FORDAm L. REV. 211 (1964) ; Seigel, The New York
"Frisk" and "Knock-not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BRooKLYN L. REV.
274 (1964) Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319 (1962) Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343-47 (1942) ;
Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization,
51 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 395 (1960). Prohibition of the authority to "stop and
frisk" could lead to radical changes in the character of local law enforcement.
It may result in forcing local law enforcement agencies to expand to attain a
lesser, but more constant, invasion of privacy than the occasional invasions of the
"stop and frisk." Another result might be a re-defining of probable cause to allow
the officer more freedom to arrest suspicious persons. Comment, 41 So. CAL. L.
REV. 161 (1968).
27. United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
28. The court implied that a momentary detention did not constitute an
arrest. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 353 (1960). The Court considered the
arrest not to have occurred when the car was stopped subsequent thereto. Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The Court found an arrest not when a
car was stopped and searched, but when the contraband was found. Carrol v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). But see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959). The Court there found an arrest when the officer restricted the
defendant's movements, but it limited its holding to the facts (very unusual facts
in that the government admitted arrest).
29. 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
30. Id. n.16.
31. Id. at 1880.
32. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
33. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1885 (1968), Justice Harlan concurring.
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considering the constitutionality of the "stop." He pointed out
that if the policeman had a right to disarm, rather than avoid,
the individual for his own protection, he must have a right to
insist upon a forcible stop. Justice White,3 4 also concurring, ob-
served that nothing in the Constitution prohibits a policeman
from addressing questions to pedestrians; however, absent
special circumstances the person approached may not be de-
tained or frisked. He asserted that, given the proper circum-
stances, a person may be briefly detained against his will while
pertinent questions are asked. After balancing the investigatory
needs of the police against the personal security of the individual,
the Supreme Court will probably uphold the constitutional pro-
priety of an investigatory "stop" as provided for in the Louisiana
statute; but the exact conditions and limitations of such a pro-
cedure remain unforeseen . 5
The primary limitation in the Louisiana statute is that the
"stop" must be grounded upon reasonable suspicion.36 As Loui-
siana is free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet
the needs of local law enforcement,3 7 it may label its standards
at whim or caprice. Ultimately, however, it is not the language
employed by the statute which determines its reasonableness,
but the reasonableness of the acts which it sanctions.3 8
The Louisiana provision authorizes a detention, as does the
New York Stop and Frisk Law, when the officer "reasonably
suspects" the person is engaged in criminal activity.3 9 The phrase
"reasonably suspects" is said to mean a "conglomerate of such
circumstances as would merit the sound suspicions of a properly
alert policeman performing his sworn duty."40 This definition
coupled with the Supreme Court's test of reasonableness 41 sup-
plies a standard no less endowed with an objective meaning than
the phrase "probable cause" and is considered as somewhat below
34. Id. at 1886, Justice White concurring.
35. The Court must analyze certain factors to determine whether the deten-
tion in each instance was reasonable, i.e., the reasonable suspicion of the police
officer, the length of detention, the location of the detention, and the admissibility
of statements made by the suspect.
36. See note 9 supra.
37. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
38. Sibron v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968). See also People v. Peters,
18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
39. See note 9 supra.
40. Kuh, Reflection on New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law and Its Claimed
Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 32, 33 (1965).
41. "[T]he facts must be judged against an objective standard: Would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action was appropriate?" Terry
v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968).
[Vol. XXIX
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probable cause on the scale of absolute knowledge of criminal
activity.42 This standard appears to be as workable as any pro-
posed.
The acts authorized by the statutory grant of authority are
readily viewed as reasonable when it is remembered that the
standard of reasonable suspicion is an objective test. Reasonable
suspicion cannot be based upon the good faith suspicions of the
police officer;4I it must not be based solely on race, poverty,
type of clothing, or age.44 For the detention to be reasonable in
each situation, the officer should be able to "point to specific
and articuable facts which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
' '45
Furthermore, to prevent abuse of this investigatory tool the
suspect should not be detained longer than the time necessary
to conduct an on-the-street investigation.4 6 The investigation
should not be extended beyond the time reasonably necessary for
the person detained to identify himself and explain his action and
for the police to check his explanation with readily available in-
formation. 47 If the information needed to verify or contradict
the suspect's explanation is not readily ascertainable, he should
be released.4 8
The Louisiana statute does not authorize the removal of the
suspect from the on-the-street encounter. Usually, when the sus-
pect is transported to the police station an arrest is said to have
occurred.4 9 This rule seems desirable, because restriction of the
individual's freedom of movement is a severe intrusion. There-
fore, unless exceptional circumstances are shown which explain
why the suspect was taken to the station, it seems desirable that
42. United States v. Rundle, 274 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; People
v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 244, 219 N.E. 2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222 (1966).
See also Seigel, The New York "Frisk" and "Knock-not" Statutes: Are They Con-
stitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964).
43. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964) ; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
44. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968).
46. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 185 (1967).
47. United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965) ; United States
v. LaVallee, 270 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp.
771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
48. United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
49. State v. Harbatuk, 95 N.J. Super. 54, 229 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1967) ; Caminito
v. City of New York, 45 Misc. 2d 241, 256 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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probable cause be required to remove the person detained from
the place of detention to any other place against his will. 50
Right To Question
In Miranda v. Arizona5' the United States Supreme Court
held that law enforcement officials must advise an arrested per-
son of certain constitutional rights before interrogation. 52 Since
the suspect is removed to unfamiliar surroundings and placed
in a police dominated atmosphere, the Court concluded that pro-
cedural safeguards must be implemented to protect the suspect
from "the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-
custody interrogation." 5' 3 Compulsion is presumed whenever the
individual, in custody or deprived of his freedom in any signifi-
cant way, is interrogated. Thus the Miranda warnings must be
given to dispel the inherent compulsion and to enable the sus-
pect to waive his constitutional rights intelligently.54
The issue arises, therefore, do the Miranda safeguards apply
to a person "stopped" for questioning? One writer observed that
"on-the-street detention under certain circumstances may have
enough of the characteristics of a station house interrogation for
a court to conclude that there is compulsion within the meaning
of Miranda."5' Considering that the detention may place the
individual in an incommunicado, police dominated atmosphere,
the same type of fear may be instilled as in a station house in-
terrogation. However, one may argue that the police do not
50. This is the thrust of the ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNAENT PRO-
CEDITRE §§ 2.00, 2.02(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). See United States v. Mitchell,
179 F.Supp.. 639 (D.D.C. 1967), where the court found an exception. The stop
was made on a busy street corner in the middle of the day, the police station
was only half block away and the suspect was in his automobile when detained.
Since the suspect was not greatly inconvenienced and would have proven an
obstacle to traffic, removal to the police station was reasonable.
51. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52. Id. at 444: "The prosecution may not use statements, whether excul-
patory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 'been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are re-
quired. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed."
53. Id. at 478.
54. Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52
IOwA L. REV. 1093, 1113 (1967).
55. Id. at 1114.
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"stop" an individual to coerce a confession, especially since it
is not certain that a crime has been committed. Their goals are
to prevent and to investigate crime, not to implicate every per-
son on the street. Moreover, the psychological coercions and
deceptions of the station house are not easily employed in this
type of circumstance.5
The Miranda decision, asserts one commentator, 57 affirmed
the distinction made in Escobedo v. Illinois5s between accusatory
and investigatory processes. If the main object of the police in
stopping and questioning is investigatory, rather than accusa-
tory, the Miranda warnings must be given at the time the right
to counsel in Escobedo arose. Thus, since the suspect's rights in
Escobedo did not arise until the investigation focused on him
as an accused, the Miranda warnings need not be given when
the police are only conducting a general investigation.5
9
This contention has two major weaknesses. First, the stop-
ping for questioning of a suspect may be considered within the
accusatory process, because statements at this critical stage may
be just as self-incriminating as those made after an arrest.60
Secondly, a footnote to the Miranda decision explained the Es-
cobedo language in terms of the Miranda holding, not vice versa.
Following its desire to prevent interrogations in compelling cir-
cumstances the Court seemed to say that the investigation focuses
on the individual whenever he is deprived of his freedom in
any significant way. Therefore, the distinction in Escobedo be-
tween the investigatory and accusatory procedures of police
seems meaningless, today and the Miranda warnings must be
given even when the police are conducting a general investiga-
tion.
This interpretation of Miranda, although seemingly compelled
by the language of the Court, would seriously hamper the utility
of detention as an investigatory tool. If the officer is required
to give the constitutional warnings to the suspect, then the per-
son detained will likely refuse to give any information. Instead,
the privilege against self-incrimination should be inapplicable
56. Id. at 1113; Comment, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 161, 180 (1968).
57. A. SPECTER & M. KATZ, POLICE GUIDE To SEARCH AND SEIZURE, INTER-
ROGATION, AND CONFESSION (1967).
58. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
59. A. SPECTER & M. KATZ, POLICE GUIDE To SEARCH AND SEIZURE, IN-
TERROGATION, AND CONFESSION 9 (1967).
60. Comment, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 161, 180 (1968) ; cf. Abrams, Constitu-




to general investigations conducted on the street when the pur-
pose of the detention is to obtain the person's name, address, and
an explanation of his suspicious behavior. Since the suspect
would have to be released or arrested if detained longer than is
necessary to check his identification or explanation of his activi-
ties, he would be afforded ample protection. The governmental
interests in prevention and investigation of crime would be en-
hanced while the individual's rights are protected. In addition,
the duty imposed on the suspect to respond would extend only to
limited enquiries permitted by statute. Therefore, if the ques-
tioning sought more than an individual's identity and an expla-
nation of his suspicious activities, the questioning, outside the
purview of the statutory provisions, would be more than merely
investigatory and the warnings would attach.
The Frisk
Traditionally, a complete search of the person has been per-
mitted when probable cause exists.61 Such a search has the two
basic purposes of procuring evidence of a particular crime and
self protection of the police officer. Since suspicious conduct
alone justifies a "stop" without reference to a particular crime,
only the latter purpose justifies a "frisk."6' Regarding the safe-
ty of the officer as paramount to the brief, though considerable,
personal invasion of the "frisk," the United States Supreme
Court concluded, in Terry v. Ohio,63 "that there must be a nar-
rowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individ-
ual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime. ' 'e4 The limited search for dangerous weap-
ons sanctioned in the Louisiana statute, as all searches in the ab-
sence of probable cause for arrest, must be strictly circum-
scribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. 6
As in the "stop" situation, the standard of "reasonable sus-
61. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) ; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960) ; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
62. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968).
63. 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
64. Id. at 1883. This authority seems to have general applicability whenever
the officer is faced with situations endangering his safety and is not necessarily
dependent upon the "stop" situations. See also Remington, The Law Relating to
"On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and
Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRam. L.C. & P.S. 386 (1960) ; Wilson,
Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CliM.
L.C. & P.S. 395 (1960).
65. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), Mr. Justice Fortas concurring.
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picion" is an objective one requiring that the officer be able to
articulate specific facts and rational inferences therefrom which
warrant the search."6 But the facts which establish reasonable
suspicion for the "frisk" are different in nature from those of
the "stop." The issue is whether a reasonably prudent police of-
ficer in similar situations would be warranted in believing that
the suspect was armed and dangerous and posed a threat to his
safety and the safety of others.6
7
If the self-protective search is valid, what evidence obtained
by it is admissible in proceedings against the individual? Obvi-
ously, since the "frisk" is designed to discover dangerous weap-
ons, articles of this nature are admissible when the officer prop-
erly conducts a reasonable search.8 Difficulty arises, however,
when the disclosed evidence is not a dangerous weapon. If the
sole purpose of the "frisk" is to uncover dangerous weapons, the
discovery of anything else will not be related to the purpose of
the frisk. 9 Allowing officers to legally seize any evidence dis-
closed by the "frisk" encourages more frequent and indiscrimi-
nate use of the frisk as a device for obtaining evidence, rather
than as an investigatory tool.7o Such a danger is heightened by
the fact that usually only the suspect and officer are present at
the time of the frisk, and probably the officer's testimony in such
circumstances will be considered more credible. 7 1
On the other hand, the main argument justifying the admis-
sibility of objects disclosed other than weapons does not concern
the scope of the frisk. The New York courts, in admitting bur-
glary tools and narcotics, have stated that the issue is not the
admissibility of the object ultimately found, but whether there
was a right to find anything. Since the police officer possesses
the right to frisk the suspect, any evidence disclosed by the frisk
is seized pursuant to that right and is therefore unobjection-
able.72 Justice Harlan, concurring in Sibron v. New York, reit-
66. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). See text accompanying note 45
supra.
67. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 60 (1949) ; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S.
642 (1878).
68. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968).
69. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E. 2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1966) (Justice Van Voorhis dissenting) ; Note, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 529, 538 (1965).
70. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E. 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966)
(Justice Van Voorhis dissenting).
71. People v. Norris, 46 Misc.2d 44, 258 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
72. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217
(1966); People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1966). See also United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ;
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319 (1962).
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erated this position, stating that where the "frisk" is reasonable
and lawful any contraband discovered incident thereto is admis-
sible Louisiana courts may find such reasoning persuasive and
admit objects other than weapons, especially since other objects
are clearly admissible under the terms of the Louisiana statute.
Conclusion
The scope and exact meaning of the Louisiana "stop and
frisk" statute is not certain, because the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not interpreted it. However, from the above observa-
tion it follows that the statute is not unconstitutional on its face.
Though there may be a temporary interference with the indi-
vidual's right to privacy, the governmental interests sought to be
protected should be considered overriding. In light of the nature
and character of the "stop" it is reasonable to uphold Louisiana's
detention for questioning, as a lesser "seizure" than an arrest,
whenever the officer "reasonably suspects" the individual of
criminal activity. If the Miranda warnings are applicable, an ex-
ception should be made to allow the officer to ascertain the iden-
tity of the suspect and obtain an explanation of his actions.
The provision relating to the "frisk" for dangerous weapons
is just as strict as the test provided for in Terry, and will be up-
held. The self-protective search is not dependent upon the "stop"
alone, but could be used whenever the officer reasonably suspects
that his safety is endangered. Where a reasonable "frisk" is com-
pleted, weapons uncovered incident thereto will be admissible.
Additionally, any other evidence discovered incident to a limited
self-protective search should be admissible; but because such a
practice might be too difficult to administer or not justified by
the exigencies of the situation, the courts may admit only dan-
gerous weapons.
Stewart E. Niles, Jr.
73. Sibron v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1906 (1968) (Justice Harlan
concurring).
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